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or regulatory decisionmakers,
science provides a systematic basis for
understanding policy problems and the
consequences of different policy options.
Thus, scientific evidence needs to play a key
role in agency decision-making. But even
though science is valuable for what it can
tell administrators about policy problems and their possible
solutions, science does not by itself provide a complete reason
for a policy decision because it does not address the normative
aspects of administrative policymaking. 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s efforts to justify
recent changes to its National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(naaqs) for ozone and particulate matter (pm) exemplify the use
— and misuse — of science by government agencies. Given the
way the epa and the courts have interpreted the Clean Air Act,
the agency has been able to cloak its policy judgments under the
guise of scientific objectivity. By doing this, the epa has evaded
accountability for a shifting set of policy positions that have
major implications for public health and the economy. The epa’s
incoherent approach to its naaqs decisions ultimately fails to
live up to the aspiration for reasoned decision-making that under-
girds contemporary administrative law in the United States.
S C I E N C E  A N D  R I S K  S TA N D A R D S
Throughout its recent ozone and pm rulemakings, which were
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finalized in July 1997, the epa attempted to justify its selection
of its air quality standards based solely on scientific evidence
regarding the health effects of pollution. By purporting to rely
on science to justify normative policy decisions, agencies like
the epa succumb to a category mistake because science speaks
to what is rather than to what should be. Relying exclusively on
science, as the epa has done in its ozone and particulate rule-
makings, is as misguided as it would be to disregard relevant
scientific information altogether. 
NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS The Clean Air Act provides
that in promulgating a new or revised naaqs, the epa must
draw upon a “Criteria Document” that reflects “the latest sci-
entific knowledge” of the health effects of the relevant pollu-
tant. Then, under Section 109 of the act, the epa is to set a stan-
dard that is “requisite to protect the public health” with “an
adequate margin of safety.”
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act provides some
additional guidance for construing the brief statutory language.
In 1970, when the current language of Section 109 was enact-
ed, the Senate report on the legislation stated that the objective
of air quality standards is to ensure “an absence of adverse
effects on the health of a statistically related sample of persons
in sensitive groups.” naaqs were intended to protect suscep-
tible groups such as “bronchial asthmatics and emphysemat-
ics who in the normal course of daily activity are exposed to
the ambient environment.” Based on this language, the epa and
the courts have construed Section 109 to require air quality
standards to “be set at a level at which there is ‘an absence of
adverse effect’ on . . . sensitive individuals.”
Moreover, naaqs must provide a “margin of safety” to
ensure that “a reasonable degree of protection is to be provid-
ed against hazards which research has not yet identified.” Thus,
at least as reflected in the 1970 Senate report, the epa is required
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to set naaqs at a level that would ensure no detectable adverse
health effects in even susceptible sub-groups of the population,
and then to add an additional margin of safety to protect against
unknown health risks that may be discovered in the future. In
short, the naaqs are apparently intended to provide near-
absolute protection against adverse health effects.
The statutory provisions for adopting naaqs, initially enact-
ed in their present form in 1970, are based on the assumption
that pollutants have thresholds for which it is possible to set a
“safe” level. Such a “threshold pollutant” causes adverse effects
only above a certain exposure level, which is designated as the
threshold level. In contrast, a “non-threshold” pollutant is one
that may cause adverse effects at any
level above zero exposure. 
For threshold pollutants, it would
appear as if science alone might
almost be sufficient to determine the
level at which an air quality standard
should be set. If a pollutant shows a
clear threshold, then science would
presumably provide the basis for
using that threshold as a “safe” point
below which the regulator could be
assured the complete protection of
public health.
But even with threshold pollu-
tants, some judgments would still be
required on the part of the epa
administrator. In particular, the
administrator must make a clear pol-
icy judgment in selecting an “ade-
quate margin of safety” to protect
against uncertain or unknown health
effects at lower exposure levels. 
The need for making a policy
judgment is even clearer for non-
threshold pollutants. Unlike thresh-
old pollutants, for which a standard
can be set at a level below the thresh-
old to provide complete health pro-
tection, the only way to protect
against all adverse health effects
from a non-threshold pollutant
would be to set a standard at the
level of zero. Given the continuum
of health effects for the non-thresh-
old air pollutants, no standard other
than zero can provide complete and
certain protection against all adverse
health effects. As a result, when reg-
ulators set standards for non-
threshold pollutants at levels other
than zero, they must at least implic-
itly do so based on some criteria
other than the science. That is
because the science indicates that
health effects likely occur at levels
below any standard selected by the regulators.
It turns out that few, if any, criteria pollutants regulated
under the Clean Air Act exhibit a clear threshold. The scientific
data for ozone and fine pm indicate a continuum of health
effects down to background (or natural) concentrations of the
pollutants in the air, at which point the health effects associ-
ated with the pollutants cannot be distinguished from effects
caused by other factors. In other words, there is no identifiable
threshold below which a standard for ozone or particulates
could be set to avoid all health effects. 
Congress has never amended the statutory language of Sec-
tion 109 to reflect that recognition. Nor has it provided any fur-














E N V I R O N M E N T
ther guidance to the epa on how to justify a non-zero standard
for a non-threshold pollutant in a way that would satisfy the
Clean Air Act’s requirement to “protect the public health . . .
with an adequate margin of safety.” 
T H E  A B A N D O N M E N T  O F  R E A S O N  
The selection of a naaqs standard, especially for a non-thresh-
old pollutant, is a quintessential risk management decision that,
while drawing on scientific evidence, ultimately turns on social,
political, and economic choices. The epa’s most recent revisions
to its ozone and fine pm naaqs not only illustrate the so-called
“science charade,” but more importantly they reveal what follows
from a regulatory regime that permits, and even encourages,
agencies to cloak their policy decisions as science. When the epa
or any other agency invokes science to justify its regulatory deci-
sions, it fails to provide the public with a transparent and prin-
cipled justification for its regulatory decisions.
LISTEN TO THE SCIENCE In July 1997, the epa promulgated
its revised primary naaqs for ozone and particular matter. The
agency revised the previous one-hour, 0.12 parts-per-million
primary ozone standard to an eight-hour, 0.08 ppm average
standard. It also added two new fine pm standards — a 15
micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) annual standard and a 65
µg/m3 daily standard for pm2.5 — while retaining the existing
pm10 standard with only minor technical changes. 
Industry groups and three states filed petitions seeking judi-
cial review of the standards in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the initial
round of that litigation, the epa argued that its “scientific
review” led it “to the inescapable conclusion” that the existing
naaqs were not protecting the public health with an ade-
quate margin of safety. After a panel of the Court of Appeals
rejected the epa’s decisions on nondelegation grounds, find-
ing that the agency failed to articulate an intelligible principle
to guide its naaqs selection, the epa appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
The agency argued before the Supreme Court that its deci-
sion under the Clean Air Act did not offend the nondelegation
doctrine because the epa had been constrained by three types
of factors that together effectively constituted an “intelligible
principle.” The three factors were the agency’s Criteria Docu-
ments reflecting “the latest scientific knowledge,” the advice
from the Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (casac), and
the rulemaking procedures specified in Section 307(d) of the
Clean Air Act. The first two factors — the Criteria Documents
and casac advice — emphasized scientific inputs exclusive-
ly. Because the last factor was merely a procedural limitation,
the epa in effect argued that science alone provided the agency
with an intelligible principle for selecting a naaqs standard. 
The agency’s resort to this “science only” justification before
the Supreme Court comported with comments made by the
epa administrator in testimony before Congress and in numer-
ous public speeches. In those presentations, Administrator
Carol Browner repeatedly implored her audience to “listen to
the science” that she suggested led inexorably to the particu-
lar standards selected by her agency.
AD HOC RULEMAKING In asserting reliance on science, the epa
claimed that it did not need to provide any consistent set of pol-
icy principles to explain its decisions. Throughout its rule-
makings, what the agency left unaddressed was the critical
question of what risk-management principle or criterion jus-
tified the administrator’s “policy choice” in selecting non-zero
standards along the continuum of predicted health risks for
ozone and fine pm. 
It is not surprising, then, that the epa has been inconsistent
in how it set the margin of safety required by the Clean Air Act.
In particular, the agency has shifted its position on whether the
margin of safety provision requires it to set primary standards
below the lowest probable adverse effects identified by scientif-
ic studies. In the recently revised ozone standard, the epa set the
primary standard at 0.08 ppm, a level at which it claimed that
adverse health effects were directly observed in clinical studies.
In past rulemakings, however, the epa has taken the posi-
tion that the margin of safety requirement directs the agency
to set the standards below the level at which adverse health
effects are found or expected in sensitive groups. For example,
in its previous revision of the ozone standard in 1979, the epa
concluded that “the most probable level for adverse health
effects in sensitive persons ... falls in the range of 0.15–0.25
ppm.” Nevertheless, the agency set the standard at 0.12 ppm,
well below the probable effects level, based on its statutory
interpretation that it is required to make a “judgment of a stan-
dard level below the probable effect level that provides an ade-
quate margin of safety.” 
When it came to its recent ozone and pm revisions, the epa
abandoned its earlier approach. It even argued in court that it was
not “required to follow any particular paradigm of decision-mak-
ing” and that “nothing in the statute requires [the administrator]
to make any specific ‘findings’ or to structure her decision-mak-
ing in any particular way.” The epa’s inconsistent application of
the margin of safety concept, combined with its assertions that
it did not even need to try to be consistent, revealed an agency
dodging its responsibility for giving the public a principled jus-
tification for its preferred policy outcome.
PM The epa’s interpretation of the scientific evidence of the
health effects from pm demonstrated that statistically signifi-
cant levels of premature mortality and significant morbidity
would remain even under the agency’s new 24-hour standard
of 65 µg/m3 for fine pm. What stopped the agency from further
tightening its daily fine-pm standard to an even more stringent
level and thereby saving thousands of additional lives? Certainly
not any justification based exclusively on a concern for pro-
tecting the public from health risks. 
The epa argued that a more stringent 24-hour standard was
either unnecessary or based on data that were too uncertain. How-
ever, those arguments were belied by other actions the agency
took. The data showing a continuing risk below the epa’s select-
ed standard came from the very same studies that the agency used
to justify reducing the standard to its selected level. If the same data
were too uncertain to justify tightening the standard still lower,
then they should have also been too uncertain for the epa to have
relied on when adopting its new standard in the first place.
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As to the lack of necessity for reducing the 24-hour standard
still lower, the epa’s analysis of the data indicated that a more
stringent standard would have saved an additional 860 lives per
year in just the two cities the agency studied (Los Angeles and
Philadelphia). The acceptance of this significant residual risk
was inconsistent with the epa’s policy in past naaqs rule-
makings as well as its decision to revise the ozone standard even
in the absence of a showing that lives were at risk.
OZONE The epa selected its new 0.08 ppm, eight-hour ozone
standard based primarily on evidence showing that the new
standard would reduce the median percentage of children
experiencing lung function decrements by less than one per-
cent (0.9 percent) relative to a 0.09 ppm standard (which was
roughly equivalent to the pre-existing 0.12 ppm, one-hour
standard). Yet, the agency’s own analyses indicated that a 0.07
ppm standard would further reduce this same health endpoint
by a similar if not greater amount. If reducing this endpoint by
0.9 percent was “requisite to protect public health,” then con-
sistency should have dictated that reducing the same endpoint
still further by a similar amount would have been “requisite.”
As the agency proceeded through several rounds of litiga-
tion over the ozone revisions, it came upon a purported expla-
nation for its choice of the 0.08 ppm standard offered by a dis-
senting judge. In the initial round of review, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit Court held that the epa failed to articulate an “intelli-
gible principle” to constrain its discretion. Dissenting from the
panel’s holding, Judge David Tatel signaled what would become
a more refined, science-based argument that the agency would
advance in subsequent rounds of litigation.
Judge Tatel argued that the scientific evidence and advice on
ozone did indeed provide a clear basis for the epa’s choice of a new
naaqsstandard. Tatel noted that “different types of health effects
[are] observed above and below 0.08 ppm,” the level selected by
the epa. Specifically, he opined that the health effects below 0.08
ppm were qualitatively different in that they were “transient and
reversible.” In petitioning the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing and
advancing arguments on further appeal, the epa resurrected
Judge Tatel’s arguments in defending its air quality standards. The
agency argued that it “sets primary naaqs at levels that provide
protection from medically significant risks and not at levels that
protect against any and all risks, or any and all effects.” The agency
also asserted that the standards should be set at the lowest level
at which studies indicated a statistically significant increase in
“adverse effects,” which the agency redefined as health effects that
are not “transient and reversible.” The epathus argued to the court
that the scientific evidence on ozone indicated a break point at
0.08 ppm, even though the agency also acknowledged, and the
record showed, that there was no known threshold for health
effects from ozone. 
Moreover, while the record showed a continuum in the fre-
quency and severity of respiratory effects at successively lower
ozone levels, it did not show a discernible discontinuum at 0.08
ppm between those effects that were “transient and reversible”
and those that were more permanent, as Judge Tatel and the
epa argued. Most of the respiratory effects on which the agency
relied to lower the primary ozone standard down to 0.08 ppm
were also transient and reversible. Thus, while it is true that the
health effects from ozone become, in a certain sense, more
transient and reversible at lower levels, the “bright line” that
Judge Tatel and the agency claimed to discern at 0.08 ppm was
not supported by the available empirical evidence. 
Most significantly, in invoking a distinction between effects
that are “transient and reversible” and those that are not, the
epa again shifted its position from past rulemakings without
offering any reasons for doing so. When the agency last revised
the ozone standard in 1979, it relied on the very same types of
transient respiratory health effects to support its standard,
expressly finding that such effects were of concern and
“adverse” — “even when reversible” and “even though transi-
tory.” Similarly, when the agency previously revised the pm
standard in 1987, it set the standard “in the lower portion of the
range where sensitive, reversible physiological responses of
uncertain health significance are possibly, but not definitely,
observed in children.” The epa’s attempt to construct a scien-
tific demarcation based on whether or not effects are “transient
and reversible” was therefore neither supported by the record
nor consistent with the agency’s own past decisions.
HEALTH BENEFITS One of the most striking examples of reg-
ulatory incoherence in the epa’s naaqs revisions lies in the
disparity between the health benefits from the revised ozone
standard and the revised pm standard. In rejecting a more
stringent alternative for the pm standard, the epa rejected an
option that would have achieved a much greater gain in
health benefits than the gain the agency anticipated it would
achieve by revising its ozone standard. If protecting the pub-
lic health with an adequate margin of safety did not require
the epa to lower the pm standard still further, then it is far
from clear why the agency was justified in revising its ozone
standard as it did. 
Based on staff analysis and consistent with casac’s advice,
the agency assumed in revising its ozone standard that its new
naaqs would not achieve any reduction in mortality. In quan-
tifying the non-mortality health benefits of the new ozone
standard, the epa estimated the total monetized value to be $60
million. In contrast, the epa estimated the incremental health
benefits of lowering the daily pm2.5 standard from the select-
ed 65 µg/m3 level to 50 µg/m3 would be $1.6 billion because
of the reduction in non-mortality risks alone. (The agency’s
analysis did not permit an estimate of health benefits from the
reduction of mortality risks, which would have made the dis-
crepancy between the pm and ozone cost-effectiveness even
more dramatic.) 
The epa’s analysis clearly indicated that the health benefits fore-
gone by the decision not to tighten the pm2.5 daily standard below
the 65 µg/m3 level dwarfed the total health benefits of the ozone
standard. The agency claimed that its ozone revision was neces-
sary in order to protect public health with an adequate margin of
safety. But it also argued that a further tightening of the pm stan-
dard to achieve significantly greater health benefits was not nec-
essary to protect public health with an adequate margin of safe-
ty. The epaoffered no explanation for why its treatment of health
risks should vary markedly from one pollutant to another.
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If the epa is to provide a more coherent justification for sig-
nificant decisions than it did for its most recent naaqs revi-
sions, how can it do so? 
PRINCIPLES A regulatory agency such as the epa has four
basic approaches available that it can use to provide a consis-
tent justification for making risk management decisions such
as setting ambient standards: 
 Eliminate all risks (or all non–naturally occurring
risks).
 Avoid unacceptable risks.
 Avoid unacceptable costs (sometimes described as the
feasibility approach).
 Balance costs and benefits. 
Although these approaches are not all equally sound strate-
gies nor are they all currently permissible under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act, they do illustrate
the range of possible ways to provide a consistent explanation
for risk management decision-making. 
ELIMINATE ALL RISKS The first approach is conceptually
straightforward: Eliminate all risk. This principle could be con-
sistently applied if the epa set its standards at levels at which
it believed there would be no risk to health. The agency could
also take a consistent risk-management approach if it chose to
minimize risk by setting standards at background levels, there-
by opting to eliminate all risks except those that are naturally
created (a zero–additive risk approach). 
Of course, for non-threshold pollutants that lack counter-
vailing health benefits, the minimize-risk principle can be
applied consistently only if the epa sets its standards at a zero
or background concentration level, something that would
effectively call for the elimination of all economic activities.
Quite sensibly, the agency has expressly disavowed any inten-
tion of adopting a zero-risk approach, and the Supreme Court
has also recognized the folly of such an approach. If the epa is
to adopt a more coherent approach to its risk management
decision-making, it will almost certainly need to choose some
other principle to justify its decision-making.
AVOID UNACCEPTABLE RISKS A second approach would be
for the agency to establish a level of acceptable risk and to rely
on such a level across its air quality standards. Rather than
always trying to minimize all risks, the agency would only
reduce risks to an acceptable level. 
The acceptable risk approach has been used in other regula-
tory contexts. For example, in setting standards for hazardous air
pollutants, the epa has presumptively defined “acceptable risk”
based on a maximum individual mortality risk of no greater than
one in 10,000. The agency has similarly set acceptable risk targets
in other contexts, including the regulation of water quality, haz-
ardous wastes, and pesticides. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration follows a similar approach, using a bench-
mark mortality risk of one in 1,000 as the level of “significant risk”
on which it bases occupational health standards. 
Extending an acceptable risk approach to naaqs decision-
making would not be easy, however, because criteria pollutants
such as ozone and pm create varied types of health effects other
than mortality. Most “acceptable risk” benchmarks established
by the epa under other regulatory programs focus on cancer
mortality. But many of the health effects considered by the
agency for pollutants such as ozone involve continuous health
effects (e.g., respiratory irritation) that vary in intensity from
serious illness to a minor nuisance. It is generally harder to
define an acceptable risk level for such continuous effects
because it is necessary to address both the frequency and sever-
ity of the disease. Moreover, a common metric for morbidity
is needed to compare alternative standards, each of which may
vary along multiple dimensions of predicted health effects
(such as if exposure contributed to circulatory as well as to pul-
monary problems).
Another issue with the acceptable risk approach is whether
to rely upon individual or population risk — or both. The epa
has yet to adopt a clear and consistent position on whether it
should base its naaqs decisions on maximum individual risk
or population risk. In its recent ozone revision, the epa appeared
in some ways to accept a population-risk approach. Yet in a pre-
vious naaqsrulemaking, the agency explicitly indicated that the
number of people exposed was not relevant because “standards
must be based on a judgment of a safe air quality level and not
on an estimate of how many persons will intersect with given
concentration levels.” The problem with relying only on levels
of risk to individuals, of course, is that it overlooks the number
of people exposed to the risk, something that clearly affects the
level of overall benefits from a regulatory standard.
Although a benefits-based approach may help to identify
inconsistencies across rules, by itself such an approach still
skirts the underlying question of what makes a particular level
of risk “acceptable” or a particular level of benefits “desirable.”
The acceptable risk approach suffers from another notable lim-
itation: It ignores the costs of meeting those standards. 
AVOID UNACCEPTABLE COSTS A third approach to consistent
risk management would keep costs below unacceptable levels.
For example, OSHA is charged by statute with developing reg-
ulations to protect workers from exposure to toxic substances
“to the extent feasible.” To say that a standard is feasible is to
say that its costs are acceptable. Of course, just stating that a
regulatory standard is “feasible” or “infeasible” is rather impre-
cise. However, just as agencies have operationalized the con-
cept of acceptable risk by setting specific risk targets, they could
similarly develop precise standards establishing acceptable and
unacceptable levels of costs. 
Such an approach, though, would disregard the benefits of
risk standards. If a standard with exceedingly high costs (or that
would cause severe economic disruption) would also save
many thousands of lives, then society almost certainly would
be better off with the standard even if the costs are high. For
example, government regulations eliminating lead from gaso-
line resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual costs
and appeared to threaten not only dislocations for the indus-
trial firms that produced lead additives but also potential gaso-
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line shortages during the transition to unleaded fuels. But those
regulations also resulted in dramatic health benefits for socie-
ty, benefits that dwarfed the costs substantially. If regulatory
agencies had consistently adhered to an approach that avoid-
ed all regulations that imposed costs exceeding a specified level
or threatened economic dislocation without any concern for
the level of corresponding benefits, they may well have delayed
or avoided phasing out lead additives in gasoline.
BALANCE COSTS AND BENEFITS To avoid such a perverse outcome,
a fourth approach for risk management would take both bene-
fits and costs into consideration and seek to achieve a consistent
balance of the two. By taking both costs and benefits into con-
sideration, regulators would be able to set risk management stan-
dards so as to achieve positive net benefits, setting them at the
level at which the benefits most outweigh the costs. Several envi-
ronmental statutes other than the Clean Air Act direct agencies
to balance benefits and costs when they are setting risk standards.
Indeed, absent statutory prohibitions to the contrary (such as in
the Clean Air Act), regulatory agencies are directed by Executive
Order 12,866 to assess both costs and benefits of significant pro-
posed regulations and are supposed to “propose or adopt a new
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the bene-
fits of the intended regulation justify its costs.” 
AD HOC APPROACH Strikingly, the epa has not only reject-
ed a benefit-cost approach in setting air quality standards, it
has rejected all four general policy principles. It has explicit-
ly ruled out zero-risk and acceptable risk approaches, and it
has successfully argued in the courts that the Clean Air Act
precludes it from adopting a feasibility or benefit/cost bal-
ancing approach. 
Instead, the epa has taken an explicitly ad hoc approach.
Given this predicament, it should not be surprising that the
agency’s account of its recent naaqs decisions has been so
inconsistent. An important step toward achieving a more prin-
cipled and consistent account of the epa’s air quality standards
would be to free the agency from the conceptual straightjack-
et in which it now finds itself and acknowledge the fiction that
its risk management decisions can be made in the absence of
any consideration of costs.
ABANDONING A FICTION The estimated costs of the recent-
ly revised ozone and pm standards make them among the most
expensive federal regulations ever promulgated in the history
of the United States. The epa estimated that the standards
would impose incremental costs exceeding $45 billion per year,
an amount larger than the annual cost of all other Clean Air Act
programs in effect at the time. The agency claims not to have
considered costs in setting its recent air quality standards, and
the high costs associated with them would appear to support
that claim. Yet it is widely recognized that the epa does, and
indeed must, at least implicitly consider costs in deciding where
to set air quality standards, the high costs of the recent ozone
and particulate standards notwithstanding. 
Society would be better off if the agency considered cost esti-
mates explicitly rather than treating the issue of cost only
implicitly. That is because costs may exhibit discontinuities and
non-linearities that can only be discerned through careful
analysis of cost functions. For example, the epa’s draft Regu-
latory Impact Analysis for ozone, published at the time of the
agency’s proposed rule, indicated that an eight-hour ozone
standard set at 0.08 ppm based on the fifth rather than the
fourth highest annual concentration would provide roughly
equivalent health protection but at approximately 20 percent
lower cost. Had the epa explicitly taken this information into
account, it could have based the standard on the fifth highest
annual concentration and saved the nation over $1 billion per
year without sacrificing health protection. 
Such an open consideration of costs would not only likely
ensure more cost-effective policy decisions, it would also bet-
ter serve some of the core principles that undergird adminis-
trative law. As John Graham, a risk expert who now heads the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, has noted, the
epa’s “legal fiction” of not considering costs when setting
naaqs “reduces political accountability for value judgments
and political choices, [and] hides from public scrutiny claims
that are made about risks, benefits, and costs (since such claims
are driven ‘underground’ in the course of regulatory delibera-
tions).” Put more simply, as Professor David Faigman has
recently argued, the “real loser in the pm/ozone drama was can-
dor.” By framing the standard-setting decision as one for which
costs cannot be taken into consideration, the epa, Congress,
and the courts have endorsed a misleading and ultimately fic-
tional basis for setting air quality standards. 
REFORM What steps can be taken that might lead the epa to
adopt a more candid and coherent account of its risk man-
agement decision-making? If the aspiration of well-reasoned
agency decision-making is to become a reality for risk man-
agement of non-threshold air pollutants, Congress will need to
step in both to authorize and encourage the epa to break free
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Society would be better off if the EPA were to consider
regulatory cost estimates explicitly rather than treating
the issue of cost only implicitly.
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from its current, incoherent approach. The Clean Air Act itself
will need to be amended if the agency is ever to pursue a prin-
cipled approach to air quality standard setting. 
Judicial review would have once been considered an option
for encouraging the epa to adopt a more candid and consistent
justification for its decision-making. But the Supreme Court
recently upheld the agency’s revised ozone and pm standards
in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia.
The Court interpreted the Clean Air Act in such a way as to pre-
clude the administrator from considering costs. With the
Supreme Court effectively affirming the incoherent approach
embedded in the longstanding interpretation of the Clean Air
Act, it was not surprising that the D.C. Circuit, on remand,
upheld the epa’s revised standards under the arbitrary-and-
capricious test and deferred ultimately to the agency’s “expert
judgment.” In the end, the epa prevailed and secured judicial
approval for its explicitly ad hoc decision-making.
Legislative change will not come easily, but it may become
more viable when the absurdity of the Clean Air Act’s out-
moded legislative model becomes evident to those across the
political spectrum. That was the case with the Delaney Clause,
which Congress amended after many years once the act was
interpreted to require the elimination of all cancer risks from
pesticide residues in food. If the Clean Air Act follows a course
similar to that taken with the Delaney Clause, then ever-advanc-
ing knowledge about the adverse effects from still-lower lev-
els of air pollutants may force the epa and Congress to confront
the absurdity of the current interpretation of the Clean Air Act.
For example, the recent identification of genetic susceptibili-
ties to pollutants such as pm and ozone may well only height-
en the demand under the existing statutory framework to set
even more stringent standards at levels that are not economi-
cally or politically feasible.
As scientific research continues to document the public
health effects that the epa already acknowledges remain under
its revised standards, the pressures to lower air quality stan-
dards ever closer to zero will persist and seem likely only to
increase over time. So will, of course, the costs for complying
with more stringent standards. Perhaps fortunately, at least for
those who value reason and candor in governmental policy-
making, this dynamic will eventually result in a broader recog-
nition of the need for statutory reform. If this is correct, then
perhaps it will only be a matter of time before Congress steps
in and adopts a more realistic legislative approach that will
bring clarity to this important domain of risk management.
C O N C L U S I O N
The recent revisions of the ozone and pm standards confirm
what has been widely known since at least the mid-1970s,
namely that Section 109 of the Clean Air Act is not realistic. As
scientific knowledge has expanded, health risks have been iden-
tified at ever lower levels. In light of this evolving evidence, it
is no longer possible to select a standard that protects the pub-
lic health, with an adequate margin of safety, from all the
adverse effects of non-threshold pollutants, at least not with-
out imposing dire economic costs on the nation. As a practi-
cal matter, the epa has had little choice but to disregard evi-
dence about substantial adverse effects on a public whose
health the agency is directed by law to protect. 
But the agency has been neither candid nor consistent about
the policy choices it has made in revising the nation’s air qual-
ity standards. Instead, it has successfully shielded its policy
decisions behind the language of science and expertise. When
agencies rely on science to explain the policy decisions they
make, they not only escape from fulfilling their duty to provide
a principled account of their decision-making, but they also can
find themselves vulnerable to expediency and post-hoc ration-
alization in their efforts to defend their actions. 
We have argued that the courts’ acceptance of a dysfunc-
tional legislative framework means that, to achieve greater con-
sistency in air quality standard setting, Congress will need to
compel the epa to come clean about what science can and can-
not say and about what policy principles justify its standards.
The agency cannot simply “listen to the science” to tell it how
to make policy choices about how many adverse health effects
or how much regulatory cost should be tolerated in society.
Risk management calls for value judgments that are both pos-
sible and desirable for public officials to defend through poli-
cy analysis and normative reasoning. To be sure, high-quality
scientific analysis is vitally needed to inform decisionmakers
about policy problems and to predict the consequences of dif-
ferent solutions, but appeals to science are no substitute for
clear and careful reasoning about the normative choices inher-
ent in public policymaking.
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